U.S. saving by William Poole
1
U.S. Saving
CFA Society of Nebraska
Omaha, Nebraska
February 15, 2007
more, and that is equally true today. The reality has
changed far, far less than the headlines suggest.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments. Robert H. Rasche, senior vice president
and director of Research, and Massimo Guidolin,
assistant vice president, provided special assis-
tance. I retain full responsibility for errors.
HEADLINE GRABBING DATA
Within the past year the personal saving ratio,
which is reported every month, has turned nega-
tive (Figure 1A), and these monthly data releases
have yielded headlines all along the way. Monthly
data on household debt service payments as a
percent of personal income have reached all time
highs (Figure 1B). The federal government is
running a large budget deficit (Figure 1C), and
the U.S. net international investment position
(Figure 1D) is now reported as a negative net
position in excess of 20 percent of GDP. Reports
in the financial press discuss the rapid accumu-
lation of foreign exchange reserves by China, held
mostly in U.S. dollars, and speculate on the impact
on U.S. interest rates and the dollar exchange
rate should the Chinese choose to diversify a sig-
nificant fraction of such holdings out of dollars.
Personal financial advisers and others frequently
are quoted as forecasting that the “boomers” are
ill prepared to finance their retirement years.1
I
am delighted to be here today—my first
trip to Omaha since coming to the St. Louis
Fed in 1998. My subject is an important,
and puzzling, one. The puzzle is nicely
illustrated by recent newspaper stories reporting
that the U.S. saving rate is at the lowest level in
73 years—that is, since 1933, the bleakest year
of the Great Depression. But let me ask five ques-
tions: Are there signs of distress all around, as
there were 73 years ago? Has there been a tremen-
dous surge of bankruptcies? Has the United
States become a nation of profligate spenders?
Are the data wrong? Are the data screwy?
My answers to these five questions are no,
no, no, no and no. But there are some puzzles to
explain, and that is what my remarks are about.
As you may be able to tell from these intro-
ductory remarks, I am not going to express deep
dismay in line with the headline news. Neverthe-
less, to avoid being misinterpreted, I want to
emphasize that my relaxed perspective on national
saving today does not imply that individual house-
holds have nothing to worry about. Many house-
holds would be much better off if they had larger
assets and less credit-card debt carrying high
interest rates. Many would have a happier and
more secure retirement if they consumed less and
accumulated more wealth during their working
years. But these points were as valid 25 years ago
when the personal saving rate was fairly consis-
tently above 6 percent as they are today when the
saving rate is negative. Moreover, I think there was
a case 25 years ago that the United States as a
whole would have been better off if it had saved
1 See, for example, Jack VanDerhei, Craig Copeland and Dallas Salisbury, Retirement Security in the United States, Washington D.C.:
Employee Benefit Research Institute, 2006.Such headline news alarms some readers and
indeed can promote a general feeling of unease
about the future standard of living of U.S. citizens.
The news reminds me of the chorus of an old
song from my youth:
You load sixteen tons, and what do you get?
Another day older and deeper in debt.
Saint Peter, don’t you call me ’cause I can’t go;
I owe my soul to the company store.2
However, there is a “rest of the story.” My
purpose today is to discuss some of the defini-
tions that are used to generate the saving data
featured in the headlines, to outline some of the
basic insights of the theories that economists
have come to rely upon to explain the savings
behavior of consumers, and then present some
additional data relevant to those theories that
suggest a vastly different perspective.
THE DEFINITIONS BEHIND THE
HEADLINE NEWS
I begin with the critical distinction between
saving and savings. Economists are often a bit
sloppy, in my view, in how they use these two
words and headline writers may not appreciate
the importance of the distinction. Saving is the
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2 Written by Merle Travis, 1947.flow of after-tax income not consumed. Roughly
speaking, saving is the part of your monthly pay-
check that is left over after paying all your bills.
You may use your saving to pay down debt or add
to your assets. Savings, with the “s” on the end,
is the stock of wealth you have accumulated—
your net worth calculated by taking the value of
all the assets you own and subtracting your lia-
bilities. Saving is a flow, savings is an accumu-
lated stock. The distinction between saving and
savings is as elementary and as important as the
distinction between a company’s income state-
ment and its balance sheet.
For the economist, the basic definition of
household income in a particular year is con-
sumption plus the change in net worth. The sav-
ing rate is then income minus consumption as a
percentage of income. The issue is simple when
the setting is simple. Suppose you have an annual
salary income of $100,000 and your only asset is
a bank deposit bearing no interest. If, over the
course of the year, you spend $95,000 on con-
sumption goods, then your saving is $5,000, which
shows up as an increase in your bank deposit.
We can think of your income as the salary of
$100,000, or as your consumption of $95,000
plus the increase of $5,000 in your net worth.
The two different approaches yield the same
answer. Your saving of $5,000 yields a saving
rate of 5 percent.
If you had consumed goods worth $105,000,
you would have had to draw down your bank
account or borrow. In either case, your net worth
would have declined by $5,000. Your income was
still $100,000, whether calculated directly from
your salary or from your consumption plus the
change in your net worth. Your saving rate would
have been minus 5 percent.
The issue becomes much more complicated
when your assets can change in price, yielding
capital gains or losses. As we will see, that is
much of what the saving rate issue is all about.
The underlying data of the headline news
are mostly derived from our National Income
and Product Accounts—the NIPA. These are flow
accounts, constructed by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), designed to measure the current
production of goods and services in some partic-
ular period, such as a year. The BEA defines per-
sonal saving as the difference between current
personal outlays and current disposable personal
income. The saving rate is saving as a percentage
of disposable income.
The NIPA framework is that of a double-entry
accounting system. By construction, gross national
product is equal to gross national income. Con-
sider the value of a company’s output. Its revenue
from sales is the value of the production. The
revenue is then distributed as income to employ-
ees, dividends to shareholders and retained earn-
ings, or undistributed corporate income. Of course,
the tax collectors get some too, and it shows up in
the NIPA as government revenue. By definition,
the total value of the product equals the total
value of the income to various income recipients.
The NIPA focus on both expenditure and
income flows has the potential to create account-
ing discrepancies because the data are collected
from different data sources. Income data are col-
lected from payroll data, IRS filings, corporate
tax reports and the like. Personal outlays are
almost entirely personal consumption expendi-
tures. The dollar value of these expenditures is
the value of the goods and services companies
sell to households. The more reliable data are
those from the demand (expenditure) side of the
national accounts. Income data are notoriously
imprecise, and they fail to add up to aggregate
GDP by as much as 2 to 3 percent. This difference
appears in the NIPA as an account called “statis-
tical discrepancy.” If income data are typically
underestimated, the NIPA saving rate will also
be underestimated. In any event, we know that
the saving rate is subject to substantial measure-
ment error and to frequent major revisions.
These observations are meant to help under-
stand the measurement issue, but they do not
resolve the apparent mystery of why the saving
rate has become negative. The statistical discrep-
ancy in the NIPA has not been growing over time.
A number of other issues I’ll flag do not solve the
mystery either, because the measurement errors
do not seem to be changing enough over time to
account for the change in the saving rate. Never-
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issues.
A number of statistical and measurement
issues have been debated in the literature on the
evolution of the U.S. saving rate. I will focus on
five distinct issues that may cause the measured
NIPA saving rate to substantially differ from a
true, unobserved personal saving rate.
The NIPA Saving Rate and Realized
Capital Gains
Gross domestic income is designed to meas-
ure income generated by current production.
Personal income goes to households and includes
wages, salaries, rents, royalties, dividends and
interest. These are all income flows derived from
current production of goods and services. Dispos-
able income is personal income less direct taxes,
which include income taxes, Social Security
taxes and the like.
All transactions involving exchange of exist-
ing assets, however, are excluded from measured
income because such transactions do not have
an associated production of goods or services. If
a household consumption unit considers any
such capital gains or losses as income, then the
NIPA framework underestimates the saving rate
as perceived by households. And, I might add, it
is perfectly sensible for a household to consider
capital gains to be income available to be spent
on consumption goods.
Here is one problem: Capital gains taxes are
considered direct taxes and subtracted from per-
sonal income in calculating disposable personal
income. Thus, capital gains income is not counted,
but tax paid as a result of realized capital gains
is counted. In an environment where there are
aggregate taxable capital gains, the NIPA saving
rate underestimates the true saving rate as seen
by households.
The capital gains issue has grown, and not
just because stock market gains have often been
substantial in recent years. A company can throw
off cash to investors either through paying divi-
dends, which appear in personal income, or
through share repurchases. Share repurchases
tend to increase stock prices, yielding capital
gains to shareholders which do not appear in
personal income. If companies have increasingly
used share repurchases instead of dividends—
which appears to me to be the case—the result
would be to create a downward bias to the meas-
ured saving rate.
NIPA Saving Rate and Pension Plans
The NIPA treat contributions to defined con-
tribution pension plans, whether made by
employees or by employers on their behalf, as
disposable personal income at the time such
contributions are made. Investment income on
these accounts is also accrued as disposable per-
sonal income. Investment income consists of
interest and dividend earnings.3 Payments from
such funds are not counted as current income,
but treated as an exchange of one financial asset—
pension accumulations—for another—cash. While
not completely clear, consistency suggests that
the unrealized capital gains accrued by defined
contribution pension plans are not counted as
income, nor is the realization of such gains in
benefit payments counted as retirement income.
Defined benefit plans are treated similarly
to defined contribution plans. Employer contri-
butions to such plans and the investment income
accruing are counted as personal disposable
income. The administrative expenses of such
plans are included in personal consumption
expenditures. Again, benefit payments are
excluded from personal disposable income.4 At
one point, government sector defined benefit pen-
sion plans were treated differently from private
sector defined benefit plans. That asymmetry
has now been changed and the above treatment
is applied to all defined benefit plans.
Note that this treatment of defined benefit
plans can generate issues in the timing of income
3 William G. Gale and John Sabelhous, “Perspectives on the Household Saving Rate,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, I:1999, p. 182.
4 Marshall B. Reinsdorf, “Alternative Measures of Personal Saving,” Survey of Current Business, September 2004, p. 20.
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4and saving since at any point in time such plans
can be under- or overfunded. Underfunding, and
subsequent “catch-up” payments, defers the
recording of income. Overfunding resulting from
capital gains on the investment portfolio can pro-
duce temporary or permanent understatement of
income from such plans.
While payments out of defined contribution
and defined benefit pension plans are not counted
as personal income, such payments are subject
to income tax. These tax payments reduce meas-
ured personal disposable income and the saving
rate at the time that the retirement benefits are
paid. The logic of this treatment in the NIPA is
that personal income is recognized when the
retirement plan contributions are earned rather
than when the benefits are paid, often many years
after being earned.
Employers make investment decisions for
defined benefit plans and retain investment risk.
Given this fact, an alternative approach, not used
in the NIPA accounts, would be, first, to remove
employer contributions as well as rental income,
dividends and interest accruing to such plans
from personal income and, second, remove
administrative expenses from personal outlays.
Then, third, under this alternative treatment, the
benefits paid out by defined benefit plans would
be added to personal income. Experiments with
these adjustments show that the impact on the
measured saving rate is minor, in part because of
the decreasing importance of defined benefit
pensions in the private sector in recent decades.5
NIPA Saving Rate and Stock Options
Stock options are a form of deferred compen-
sation to employees. At the time they are
granted, they are not treated as generating income
for the employee, nor do they produce a charge
against profit and loss for the employer. At the
time that nonqualified stock options are exer-
cised, the difference between the market price
and the exercise price of the option is reported
as capital gain on the employee’s income tax
return and the employer receives a tax deduction
for this same difference.6 In principle the exer-
cise of a nonqualified stock option generates
income that is reported for purposes of assessing
unemployment insurance taxes. Since reported
unemployment insurance wage and salary
income are the basic data used to construct com-
pensation in the NIPA, taxable option income
likely is included in personal income. However,
income from nontaxable incentive stock options
does not get included in personal income.
NIPA Saving Rate and Deferred
Compensation
Increasing use of deferred compensation can,
in principle, bias the NIPA saving rate down-
ward. Compensation is accrued in national
income at the time it is earned. However, it is
only recorded in Personal Income at the time
that it is received. Growing deferred compensa-
tion would lead to an increasing discrepancy
between accrued compensation and received
compensation. If households determine their
consumption patterns on the basis of earned
compensation (whether or not it is received)
then the measured saving rate is biased down-
ward. However, since 1959 wage accruals less
disbursements as recorded in the NIPA accounts
have never been more than 0.3 percent of per-
sonal income, so deferred compensation cannot
have made a significant contribution to the nega-
tive trend in the saving rate.7
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5 Jack VanDerhei, Craig Copeland, and Dallas Salisbury, Retirement Security in the United States, Washington, D.C.: Employee Benefit Research
Institute, 2006, pp. 44-50.
6 Some stock options (incentive stock options) do not result in a tax liability to the employee or a tax deduction for the employer. It is believed
that nonqualified stock options are the most prevalent form. For a detailed discussion of the treatment of stock options in the NIPA see Carol
Moylan, “Treatment of Employee Stock Options in the U.S. National Income Accounts,” Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of
Commerce (undated).
7 See the NIPA table: “Relation of Gross Domestic Product, Gross National Product, Net National Product, National Income, and Personal
Income.”NIPA Saving Rate and Purchases of
Consumer Durable Goods
The accumulation of reproducible capital
goods purchased by households is not treated
symmetrically in the NIPA. Purchases of newly
constructed houses are considered in the NIPA
as an investment activity, not a consumption
expenditure at the time of purchase. Houses are
treated as assets that generate housing services or
rental income and depreciate over time regard-
less of whether the units are owner-occupied or
are owned by a rental business. Consequently,
over the useful life of the house owner-occupiers
are treated as if they are both landlords and ten-
ants renting the property from themselves. An
imputation is made for rent from the owner-
occupied unit, based on market data from com-
parable rental units. This imputed rent is included
in personal consumption expenditures for each
period. On the income side of the accounts this
imputation is included in rental income.
In principle, the accounting applied to houses
should apply to all purchases of durable goods
by households, including automobiles, household
appliances, electronic equipment and so forth.
In practice consumer durables purchases are
treated like food purchases—a current outlay
that is quickly consumed. Thus, in the NIPA pur-
chases of newly produced consumer durables
are included in entirety at the time of purchase,
rather than imputing a flow of services from the
assets over their useful lives. If cars, for example,
were treated like a house in the NIPA, the con-
sumption entry would be imputed transportation
services, including depreciation, from cars rather
than the amount spent on the car itself at time of
purchase.
Estimates of the household saving rate that
treat purchase of consumer durable goods as
consumption and impute service flows from such
goods as consumption have been constructed.8
These alternative estimates show a higher level
of the saving rate and different behavior of the
saving rate over business cycles. However, the
negative trend observed in the NIPA saving rate
over the past 10 to 15 years is evident in this
alternative measure.
A LITTLE BIT OF
CONSUMPTION THEORY
The foundations of modern economic theory
of household consumption behavior were estab-
lished a half century ago. The pioneering work in
this field was done in the 1950s and early 1960s
by Milton Friedman and by Franco Modigliani
and coauthors.9 The common starting point for
these theories is that households derive utility,
or satisfaction, from their consumption over
multiple periods. The theoretical concept of
consumption includes the flow of services from
consumer durables, not the expenditures on
durables measured in the NIPA. In Modigilani’s
formulation, the multiple periods span the life-
time of the household and encompass both
working years and a period of retirement. The
motivation assigned to households is to maximize
the utility derived from consumption over the
multi-period horizon. Under this assumption,
households smooth their consumption over time.
Faced with fluctuations in income, households
use borrowing, saving, and wealth accumulation
as the tools by which they achieve the desired
time profile of consumption. In this framework,
the principal determinant of consumption is not
current personal disposable income, but rather
household net worth.
Ando and Modigliani show that this theoret-
ical framework can be used to derive hypotheses
about aggregate household consumption and
8 See, for example, Marshall B. Reinsdorf, “Alternative Measures of Personal Saving,” Survey of Current Business, September 2004, Chart 5, p. 23.
9 M. Friedman, A Theory of the Consumption Function, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957. Franco Modigliani and Richard
Brumberg, “Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data,” in Kenneth K. Kurihara, ed., Post
Keynesian Economics, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1954, pp. 388-436. Albert Ando and Franco Modigliani, “The ‘Life-
Cycle’ Hypothesis of Saving: Aggregate Implications and Tests,” American Economic Review, March 1963, 53(Part 1), pp. 55-84.
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they conclude that, with a stable age distribution
of the population and continuing productivity
growth, over time household net worth should
tend to grow at a constant rate.10
ANOTHER STORY:
EVIDENCE FROM THE FLOW
OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS
The flow of funds accounts published by the
Board of Governors are another source of data on
personal saving and household wealth accumu-
lation. The personal saving concept in these
accounts is conceptually the same as the NIPA
measure, but because different source data are
used, the numbers are not identical.11 From the
flow of funds accounts it is possible to construct
another concept of personal income and con-
sumption, and hence saving, that treats expendi-
tures on consumer durables as investment and
measures consumption as a flow of services, as
suggested by theories of consumption behavior.
Yet another perspective is available from the
balance sheet data in the flow of funds accounts.
End-of-year balance sheets for the household
(and nonprofit institution) sector are available
from 1946. End-of-quarter balance sheets are
available beginning in 1952. These tables contain
estimates of reproducible assets, financial assets,
liabilities and net worth for the various sectors.12
Market values are used for housing assets and
corporate equity in these accounts, though hold-
ings of bonds are reported at face value. Thus,
the changes in household net worth measured in
these accounts include capital gains/losses on
both houses and equities.
Raymond Goldsmith also constructed esti-
mates of net worth on nonfarm households and
nonprofit institutions in his monumental Study
of Saving.13 These data are available for selected
years from 1900 through 1949. Albert Ando and
E. Cary Brown extended these data to annual time
series from 1929 through 1958.14 Ando and
Brown also constructed measures of consumption
defined as total personal consumption expendi-
tures, less personal consumption expenditures
on durable goods plus depreciation of the stock
of durable goods valued at replacement cost.15
Since the stock of consumer durable goods
recorded in the flow of funds accounts is meas-
ured at replacement cost, a comparable series for
annual consumption can be constructed by sub-
tracting the annual change in the flow of funds
measure of the stock of consumer durables from
the annual NIPA total personal consumption
expenditure measure. The time series of these
measures of annual consumption to end-of-year
household net worth are shown in Figure 2 on an
annual and five-year average basis. The behavior
of these time series is quite consistent with the
theory that consumption should be proportional
to net worth. There are small fluctuations in the
series from year to year that largely average out
over five years. The notable exceptions are during
the Great Depression and during the second half
of the 1990s when household net worth changed
rapidly with major stock market fluctuations.
The annual percentage change in both the
Ando-Brown and the flow of funds series, less
the December-to-December rate of CPI inflation
U.S. Saving
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10 See Ando and Modigliani, footnote 30, equation (b), p. 77.
11 Daniel Larkins, “Note on the Personal Saving Rate,” Survey of Current Business, February 1999, p. 8.
12 For annual data, see Table B-100.
13 R.W. Goldsmith, D.S. Brady, and H. Menderhausen, A Study of Saving in the United States, Volume III, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1956, Table W-22.
14 Albert Ando, E. Cary Brown, Robert M. Solow and John Kareken, “Lags in Fiscal and Monetary Policy,” Stabilization Policies, Commission
on Money and Credit, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963, p. 150.
15 Albert Ando, E. Cary Brown, Robert M. Solow and John Kareken, “Lags in Fiscal and Monetary Policy,” Stabilization Policies, Commission
on Money and Credit, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963, Table I-A1, footnote 6, p. 152.ECONOMIC GROWTH
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Figure 3
Growth of Household Net Worth Less CPI Inflationis shown in Figure 3. These series measure the
real (i.e. inflation adjusted) rate of change of
household net worth. Both series are quite volatile.
However, neither series exhibits a trend, and the
means of the series are quite close. The mean
real growth of household net worth from 1929
through 1958 is 3.0 percent. The mean real growth
of the flow of funds measure of household net
worth from 1946 through 2005 is 3.6 percent.
Again, the data are consistent with the broad
implications of the received economic theory on
the determinants of aggregate consumption.
There is not uniform agreement among econ-
omists that increases in net worth generated by
capital gains should be considered saving. Some
argue that the relevant capital gains are those
generated by increased productivity of the under-
lying asset, and capital gains that do not con-
tribute to increased future income should not be
treated as saving. Of course, there is no obvious
way to separate observed capital gains into those
generated by higher productivity of capital and
those that could result from changes in tastes or
risk premiums. There is now general agreement
among economists that a significant increase in
trend productivity occurred in the U.S. economy
starting around the mid 1990s. A major stock
market boom occurred in the late 1990s.
Over most of the post-World War II period,
the personal saving rate averaged about 6 percent,
with some higher years from the mid-1970s to
mid-1980s. The negative trend in the NIPA saving
rate started in the mid-1990s, about the same time
the stock market boom started. Thus it is hard to
dismiss the hypothesis that the decline in the
measured saving rate in the late 1990s reflected
the response of consumption to large capital gains
from corporate equity. Evidence from panel data
of households also supports the conclusion that
the decline in the personal saving rate since 1984
is largely a consequence of capital gains on cor-
porate equities.16
As is well known, the stock market boom
collapsed in 2001, and equity prices are only
now returning to the previous peak levels. Sub-
sequent to the stock market boom, however, there
was a major housing boom in the United States
both in terms of construction and property values.
It is more problematic to argue that the recent
growth in household net worth, supported by
capital gains in housing, reflects improved pro-
ductivity trends. Nevertheless, in the past several
years, consumption demand appears to have
responded to the capital gains in housing. There
is substantial evidence of “equity extraction” by
homeowners during the recent housing boom,
and cross-section evidence of large responses of
consumption by some groups of households to
increases in house values.17
As an alternative measure of the saving rate,
we can consider the ratio of the change in house-
hold net worth from the flow of funds accounts
to the NIPA measure of personal disposable
income. The annual and five-year average data
for this series are shown in Figure 4. Year to year,
the movements are quite volatile, but the nega-
tive trend characteristic of the headline saving
rate is not present. Indeed, in the late 1990s this
ratio jumped up, reflecting large capital gains on
corporate equities, fell in 2000-2001 reflecting
the end of the stock market boom, but has moved
above its long-term average in 2003-2005.
CAPITAL GAINS AND LONG-TERM
REAL INTEREST RATES
The evidence presented above suggests that
the behavior of aggregate consumption in the
United States relative to household net worth
over the past two decades is consistent with long-
U.S. Saving
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16 F. Thomas Juster, Joseph P. Lupton, James P. Smith, and Frank Stafford, “The Decline in Household Saving and the Wealth Effect,” Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FEDS Discussion Paper 2004-32.
17 Andreas Lehnert, “Housing, Consumption, and Credit Constraints,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FEDS Discussion
Paper 2004-63. Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy, “Estimates of Home Mortgage Originations, Repayments, and Debt on One-to-Four-
Family Residences,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FEDS Discussion Paper 2005-41.established patterns. Thus, most of the observed
negative trend in the NIPA saving rate seems to
be attributable to the omission of capital gains
and losses from measured personal disposable
income. The evidence suggests that it is not a
coincidence that increases in household wealth
and a long-term downward trend in the NIPA
saving rate have occurred together. Increases in
household wealth have been driven by increases
in stock prices after 1982, albeit with some sig-
nificant fluctuations, and by the more recent
increase in home values after 2001.
This observation, however, leaves a question:
Why have we observed such high capital gains
on corporate equities and housing? Part of the
story is the substantial decline in inflation and
greater confidence in sustained low inflation
after 1982. At that time, also, changes in tax and
other policies contributed to higher economic
growth and increases in corporate profits, which
have been growing most years since 1982. But
another part of the story may be a downward
trend in real interest rates since the late 1990s.
Declining real interest rates increase asset values.
Recent yields on indexed bonds both in the
United States and globally appear very low, rela-
tive to the conventional wisdom on the histori-
cal behavior of real yields. With the exception of
the United Kingdom, where indexed bonds were
introduced in the early 1980s, markets in infla-
tion indexed debt are relatively new. The U.S.
Treasury started issuing such securities in 1997.
The French introduced a bond that is denomi-
nated in Euros and indexed to the Euro area har-
monized CPI inflation in 2002. For the past four
years, the real yield on these bonds has fluctuated
around two percent or slightly higher.
To infer the behavior of U.S. real yields since
the early 1990s, we can use U.K. indexed bond
data and assume that U.S. yields have moved in
similar fashion or we can use U.S. data that are
constructed from survey measures of inflation
expectations. Such data are shown in Figure 5.
The first series shown there is the 10-year Treasury
constant maturity yield less the 10-year inflation
expectation reported in the Survey of Professional
Forecasters.18 The second series is the monthly
average yield on the 10-year U.K. indexed bond
for the middle month of each quarter. The third
series is the monthly average 10-year constant
maturity Treasury yield, again for the middle
month of each quarter.19 The series inferred from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters is quite
consistent with the market yield on the indexed
bond for the periods where both series are
available.
These data suggest that a significant decline
in long-term real interest rates started in the early
1990s, when the estimated real yield averaged
around 3.5 percent. More recently, the average
real yield has been around 2 percent. This nega-
tive trend is also visible in the U.K. indexed yield,
which declined rapidly in the late 1990s from
around 3.5 percent to 2 percent or below in recent
years. A decline in global real rates of this size,
if expected to be permanent, should produce a
major upward revaluation of the value of long-
lived assets such as corporate equities and hous-
ing. Hence the explanation of the observed trend
in the conventional saving rate in the U.S. can
likely be traced, in considerable part, to global
changes in real rates of interest.
Where do these observations leave us? I’ll
offer two tentative conclusions. First, household
saving behavior does not seem to have changed
in any fundamental way. What has changed to a
degree is the trend in asset values. Households
have consumed some of the increase in asset val-
ues in about the same way they always have.
My second tentative conclusion is that the
behavior of households, though perfectly sensi-
ble and responsible for households as a whole,
has led to a situation in which the United States
as a whole is saving too little of its national out-
18 The Survey of Professional Forecasters data are collected once a quarter by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The data are available
since November 1991. The data plotted are the monthly average 10-year constant maturity Treasury yield for the middle month of each quarter
less the 10-year inflation expectation reported in the SPF.
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Figure 5
10-Year Real Interest Rate Measuresput. U.S. domestic investment has not suffered,
because capital has been flowing into the United
States from abroad. However, at some point the
U.S. net international investment position will
stop becoming ever more negative. U.S. saving
will then finance a larger fraction of U.S. domes-
tic investment and, perhaps, repurchase some
U.S. assets now held by international investors.
There is no reason why this adjustment should
be difficult or disorderly, but it will require that
U.S. consumption outlays expand more slowly
than U.S. GDP for a time.
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